Electronic Commerce
ULCC Commercial Law Strategy - Jurisdiction and the Internet; Are the Traditional Rules Enough?
Jurisdiction and the Internet; Are the Traditional Rules Enough?
This paper in Word Perfect
by Ogilvy Renault
Introduction
The internet is an increasingly important
communication and business tool. Many consequences of its use, however, are
not specifically addressed by existing law. Moreover, unique aspects of internet
communications may make it resistant to the application of traditional legal
principles and rules.
Nowhere is this more evident than in disputes over
forum. Traditional rules relating to jurisdiction and competence incorporate
a notion of territoriality. But internet communications are not geographically
dependent. The very origin of an e-mail message may be unknown. Website
information cannot be confined to a target audience, but is disseminated
simultaneously to a global market. It may affect individuals in a myriad
of jurisdictions, all of which have their own particular local laws.
This gives rise to enormous challenges. If someone
posts a message on a website, can he or she be prosecuted for obscenity,
See footnote 2
trademark infringement
See footnote 3
, slander
See footnote 4
or deceptive trade practices
See footnote 5
in the courts of any jurisdiction where the message may be downloaded?
Or should the website operator only be subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of his or her residence, or where the server is located? If someone
buys goods or services over the internet from a company in another jurisdiction,
whose court may properly hear their disputes?
See footnote 6
Not only is the determination of forum for internet
disputes challenging, but it has legal, practical and commercial implications.
In the absence of evidence that foreign law applies, courts have traditionally
applied the substantive and procedural rules of the forum.
See footnote 7
Competence based on too loose a test - for example, the conclusion
that a website operator is carrying on business in every place where information
may be downloaded, and hence is amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts
in each of those places
See footnote 8
- will make conducting business or even simply communicating in
cyberspace a risky and expensive proposition. On the other hand, a party
should not be able to escape the consequences of his or her own negligence
or misconduct based solely on use of this new medium.
See footnote 9
In this paper, in discussing issues relating to courts'
jurisdiction over cases arising from internet use, extensive reference will
made to selected American judgements.
See footnote
10
Since U.S. companies are in the forefront of internet technology,
its courts have already had numerous occasions to deal with internet-related
jurisdiction problems. These precedents will likely influence Canadian courts
when they are seized with similar issues. The issue of courts' jurisdiction
over internet-related activities is associated with broader constitutional
questions. There has been and still is much debate as to whether internet
use and content should be regulated and, if so, how and by whom. Since the
internet is a medium of communication which virtually knows no boundaries,
its regulation within Canada is bound to raise challenging constitutional
questions which will have to be resolved in the context of Canada's federal
structure. Whether the provincial legislatures or Parliament may regulate
the internet _ and to what extent each order of government may do so _ will
surely be the source of constitutional litigation, as were communication
by radio and by telephone in their day.
Therefore, before reviewing the issue of the courts'
jurisdiction to hear internet- related cases, we will briefly address the
preliminary constitutional question of who may regulate the internet. We
propose to review the existing case law relating to legislative jurisdiction
over communication and anticipate, in broad terms, how this issue is likely
to be resolved.
Regulating the Internet: Jurisdiction in Cyberspace
The internet has been described
by the U.S. Supreme Court as an "international network of interconnected
computers"
See footnote
11
. Although the internet is first and foremost a means of
communication, it knows no territorial limits. This characteristic is fundamental
to the issue of legislative jurisdiction.
Legislative Jurisdiction over
Communication
By virtue of Section
92(10)(a) of the Constitutional Act, 1867, the federal Parliament
has exclusive legislative jurisdiction over "works" and "undertakings" connecting
one province with another and which relate to transportation or communication.
See footnote
12
This two-fold jurisdiction extends to inter-provincial
communication infrastructures ("works").
See footnote
13
It also extends to organizations or enterprises involved in
inter-provincial communication ("undertakings").
See footnote
14
On that basis, courts have confirmed Parliament's exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate works and undertakings relating to television
communication and telephone communication.
See footnote
15
Courts have also held that Parliament
has, by virtue of its peace, order and good government ("POGG") power, a
broader legislative jurisdiction over the entire field of communication by
radio.
See footnote
16
There is academic support for the proposition that Parliament
also has, under its POGG power, exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the
entire field of television communication.
See footnote
17
Some authors have even argued that Parliament's POGG power
extends to all inter-provincial communication, including communication by
telephone.
See footnote
18
Legislative Jurisdiction to Regulate the Internet:
Basis and Extent
It is difficult to predict
with any degree of certainty the position that Canadian Courts are likely
to adopt concerning legislative jurisdiction to regulate the internet as
a whole or the various components and actors that constitute the internet.
The question has _ to our knowledge _ yet to be addressed by legal scholars
and the courts. However, it is reasonable to expect that the issue will arise,
as history shows that the advent of new means of communications has consistently
given rise to important constitutional litigation over legislative
jurisdiction.
It is also reasonable to expect
the courts to grant Parliament some, if not all, legislative authority to
regulate the internet. Through the years, the courts have consistently brought
within the ambit of Section 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act,
1867 _ which only mentions telegraphs _ new means of communication which
have effects extending beyond the reach of a given province.
See footnote
19
In our view, a strong argument
can be made that Parliament is vested with exclusive legislative jurisdiction
to regulate works and undertakings which are an integral part of the internet
communication system, not unlike Parliament's jurisdiction over works and
undertakings relating to telephone communication. Once this principle is
recognized then, on the basis of existing jurisprudence, the scope of
Parliament's jurisdiction can be said to extend to matters, such as labour
relations, which form an essential part of the management and operation of
those works and undertakings.
See footnote
20
Parliament, therefore, also arguably has jurisdiction to regulate
the content of communications by internet, just as its jurisdiction over
undertakings related to television extends to the regulation of the content
of television programs.
See footnote
21
Courts could also vest Parliament
with a broader legislative jurisdiction to regulate not just works and
undertakings related to the internet, but the entire field of communication
in cyberspace. Such jurisdiction could be founded on Parliament's POGG power
and supported by authorities which argue in favour of a POGG-based federal
jurisdiction over all inter-provincial communications.
The recognition of Parliament's
jurisdiction over internet-related works and undertakings would not preclude
provincial legislation having an incidental impact on the internet or on
internet communication. Provincial legislation which does not specifically
and directly apply to federal undertakings and which is otherwise within
provincial legislative authority would be valid so long as it does not impair,
sterilize or paralyze the federal undertaking.
See footnote
22
2. Courts'
Jurisdiction in Internet Disputes
Principles underlying competence and forum non
conveniens
Before considering courts' jurisdiction over
internet activities, it is important to review the bases on which courts
generally may assert their competence, and the circumstances in which they
will yield to the competence of the courts in another state.
1. Competence over civil disputes
Courts first of all assert jurisdiction in civil
matters on the basis of the geographical location of the parties. The primacy
of in personam or personal jurisdiction is reflected in both civil
and common law regimes, which provide that the defendant's residence in the
jurisdiction confers authority to its court in the absence of any other
connecting factor between the territory and the dispute.
See footnote
23
It has long been obvious, however, that this limited
basis for competence is not enough. Human interaction has never respected
state borders. With the rise of international commerce and communication
tools that transcend state boundaries, states have by necessity or design
expanded the grounds for their courts' competence. This has led to courts
regularly asserting jurisdiction over defendants outside their territory.
a. Personal jurisdiction under Canadian
law
The grounds for competence over extra-territorial
defendants differ from province to province, but all rest on a notion of
a "real and substantial connection" to the jurisdiction of the court.
See footnote
24
The following are the statutory grounds for Canadian courts
asserting competence over extraterritorial defendants in civil disputes:
The
business activities which gave rise to the litigation were conducted in the
province;
See footnote
25
(1) a tort
or delict was committed in the province;
See footnote
26
(2) damages
from a tort or a contractual breach were sustained in the province;
See footnote
27
(3) contractual
obligations were to be performed in the province;
See footnote
28
(4) the parties
to a contract specified that the courts of the province would have competence
over any disputes arising from it;
See footnote
29
a
contract specifies that disputes are to be governed by the laws of the province;
See footnote
30
(5) in a dispute over support or custody
or the effects of marriage, one of the spouses or children is domiciled or
resident in the province;
See footnote 31
(6) the dispute concerns real
property or goods situate in the province.
See footnote 32
As well, every province has a provision of law conferring
discretionary power on its courts to take competence in circumstances where
there is some other "real and substantial connection" other than those
specifically identified by statute.
See footnote 33 The ability
of courts to adjudicate disputes is thus only limited by judicial creativity,
constitutional restraints and the knowledge that courts in other provinces
and states may refuse to enforce judgments by courts which have improperly
asserted jurisdiction. This has led the Supreme Court of Canada to emphasize
the need for "order and fairness" in determining appropriate forum, and to
caution Canadian courts against over-reaching.
See footnote 34
b. Personal jurisdiction under U.S. law
The exercise of determining whether a U.S. court
is competent to hear a dispute resembles that used by Canadian courts, but
is complicated by the overlay of the Due Process Clause of the
14th Amendment of the Constitution.
See footnote 35
As in Canada, the starting point for jurisdiction
over parties to a dispute is their presence in the forum. A court may assert
"general" jurisdiction where the defendant is domiciled in the state or has
"continuous and systematic" activities there.
See footnote 36 Otherwise,
a court must find grounds for "specific" jurisdiction. This requires a finding
of sufficient contact between the forum and the non-resident defendant. The
court then must analyze whether the exercise of its jurisdiction is consistent
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice".
See footnote 37 This
is sometimes cast in terms of the reasonable expectation of the parties of
having their disputes litigated in the particular forum.
See footnote 38
One test often used to determine specific jurisdiction
in the U.S. is the application of the "purposeful availment" test.
See footnote 39 Under
this rule, the court analyzes whether the defendant has deliberately taken
the opportunity to conduct activities in the forum and thereby obtain the
benefits of the domestic law. If so, and assuming the exercise of jurisdiction
is otherwise reasonable and fair, the court will be competent to hear a dispute
arising from those activities. The purposeful availment test, and other rules
used to establish specific jurisdiction, do not require that a defendant
have a physical presence in the forum.
See footnote 40 In the
words of the U.S. Supreme Court, the defendant's conduct and connection with
the forum must only be such that he "should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there".
See footnote 41
2. Forum non conveniens
As the grounds for assuming competence have increased,
so too have disputes over forum. Defendants sued in foreign courts more and
more frequently attempt to bring the case back to their own domestic forum.
Under the forum non conveniens principle, a court may stay or dismiss
a suit if it is persuaded that there is another forum that is more closely
connected to the events giving rise to the suit, or otherwise better suited
to adjudicate the issues.
Although all Canadian jurisdictions recognize the
principle of forum non conveniens, the rules respecting its application
are not elaborated in any detail in governing legislation. Art. 3135 of the
Quebec Civil Code, for example, says simply that a court may decline
jurisdiction "if it considers that the authorities of another country are
in a better position to decide." Provisions in common law statutes are equally
succinct.
See footnote 42 This
legislative restraint has allowed the courts to adapt fluid criteria on forum
and adapt those criteria to specific disputes.
The starting point for a court's consideration of
a forum non conveniens motion is evidence of the existence of another
court more appropriate for the adjudication of the parties' dispute.
See footnote 43 This
involves a review of the connections between the action and the two (or more)
forums competing for jurisdiction. In addition to obvious factors like the
applicable law and the site of the activities giving rise to litigation,
courts consider practical factors such as the location of the parties and
key witnesses; and the location of evidence.
See footnote 44
The weight to be given to each factor varies according
to the circumstances of the case and with the court adjudicating the motion.
In some recent decisions, Canadian courts have declined seemingly well-founded
forum non conveniens applications despite the occurrence of the alleged
negligence in the competing jurisdiction.
See footnote 45 This
flies in the face of well-established caselaw stating that the manifestation
of damages in the province by itself will not be sufficient to ground competence,
if the act giving rise to the damage and other key elements are all located
in another province.
See footnote 46
Competence over internet
disputes: The American experience to date
To date there have been no reported Canadian cases
on competence over disputes arising from internet use.
See footnote 47 The
increasing use of the medium, however, and the broad rules governing personal
jurisdiction in both civil and common law provinces, make such caselaw
inevitable. In due course Canadian courts will have to wrestle with such
issues as whether operating a website constitutes "carrying on business"
in a particular province; whether a New Brunswick seller of products advertised
over the Web is amenable to prosecution under consumer protection laws in
B.C.; whether a Manitoba court is competent to hear a lawsuit pitting a
Saskatchewan company against an Ontario company, simply because the server
for the internet communications was located in Winnipeg; and whether a Quebec
court can compel a non-resident defendant to make his website comply with
the requirements of provincial language laws.
In the absence of Canadian authorities, our courts
may turn to American caselaw when faced with these questions. Whether guidance
will be obtained may depend on how soon it is sought. Prior to the mid-nineties,
there were very few decisions by U.S. courts on competence over internet
disputes.
See footnote 48 Since
1995, there has been a veritable explosion of cyberspace litigation. American
courts have used various tests to determine whether they have jurisdiction
over internet disputes. Some courts have simply applied traditional rules,
while others have tried to devise new tests to accommodate the peculiarities
of the medium.
As a perhaps inevitable result,
it is already difficult to find complete consistency in the application of
rules relating to competence. A review of four recent decisions makes this
point. These cases were chosen because they illustrate how differently courts
may approach the issue of their jurisdiction over internet disputes, depending
on the applicable state rules, the facts of the case, public policy, and
the court's ability or desire to adapt traditional jurisdictional rules to
a new medium.
Inset Systems Inc. v. Instruction Set Inc.
See footnote 49
Inset Systems Inc. ("Inset") was a software company
based in Connecticut and Instruction Set Inc. ("Instruction") was a technology
company based in Massachusetts. Inset sued in its home state for an injunction
and damages based on the defendant's use of the Inset name as the title of
its webpage and in its toll-free number ("1-800-US-INSET"). Instruction asked
the court to decline jurisdiction on the grounds that it had no office or
employees in Connecticut, and only conducted its affairs regularly in
Massachusetts.
Under Connecticut's long-arm statute, its courts
have specific jurisdiction over any non-resident defendant who repeatedly
solicits business in the state, subject only to the due process requirements
of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The court in
this case found that Instruction's webpage was a solicitation of business
which had been continuously in effect over the previous six months. Since
there were about 10,000 internet users in the state who could have been exposed
to this solicitation, the court concluded that it had specific jurisdiction.
The court further found that its assumption of
jurisdiction did not offend the due process requirement of "minimum contacts"
with the forum. Since the defendant had set up a webpage and a toll-free
number which could be used by anyone in the U.S., including internet users
in Connecticut, Instruction must have reasonably foreseen that it could be
sued in the state's courts on the basis of its acts. The court also held
that the defendant would not be greatly prejudiced by its decision because
the distance between Connecticut and Massachusetts is not great, and it had
already retained counsel in the state.
The actual result in this case does not seem
terribly unjust given the proximity of the competing jurisdictions. The court's
reasoning, however, must give pause to any website operator. The mere possibility
of consulting a website from any particular territorial jurisdiction was
deemed sufficient to give rise to a finding of business activity there. No
specific attempts to solicit business from citizens of Connecticut (as opposed
to those in the other 49 states) was necessary to ground competence. On the
court's reasoning, a company operating a website and a toll-free number should
reasonably anticipate being sued in the courts of any state. The only safeguard
to over-reaching jurisdiction was the consideration of fair play, which was
met by the court's conclusion that it would not greatly inconvenience Instruction
to defend in the forum.
Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc.
See footnote 50
This litigation involved an Arizona company and a
Florida company with the same name, both offering consultation services for
advertising on the internet. The Arizona company sued in its home state for
infringement of its federally registered trademark "Cybersell". The defendant
Florida company moved for a dismissal based on the absence of jurisdiction
of the Arizona court.
Applying the "purposeful availment" test, the Arizona
court found that it was necessary to distinguish between "active" and "passive"
websites. Passive sites only transmit information, and are not directed at
persons in any particular territory. The court concluded that there must
be something more to indicate that a website operator has purposefully directed
his activity in a substantial way to the forum's residents. Examples of website
attributes sufficient to trigger a finding of purposeful availment would
include a chance to register a user name or be put on a mailing list, or
the placement of a toll-free number or e-mail address to obtain further
information. A large number of "hits" from users in any particular jurisdiction
might also give rise to specific jurisdiction of its courts.
Based on these criteria, the U.S. Court of Appeals
upheld the lower court's decision to dismiss the Arizona action for lack
of personal jurisdiction over the Florida defendant. The court found that
the defendant's website was essentially passive. Internet users who hit the
site were given the opportunity to record their addresses but could not buy
products or services without taking further steps to contact the company.
The purpose of the site was not the direct transaction of business, but rather
the advertising of services which could be obtained by means other than through
the internet.
There is a logical connection between the purpose
of the website and the operator's reasonable expectation of the consequences
that may flow from its use, including the possibility of being sued outside
his home state. Making this distinction represents an improvement on the
blanket approach of the Connecticut court in the Inset case.
Unfortunately, the court in Cybersell also
held that specific jurisdiction can be based on the number of times a site
is "hit" by users in a particular forum. This is not reasonable, since the
use of the site is completely out of the control of the operator. It could
be argued that a high level of interest in a site from a particular jurisdiction
should alert an operator to the possibility of a lawsuit there. This presupposes,
however, that a website operator may know who is consulting the site. The
burden the test places on operators is very heavy, since it is well nigh
impossible for an operator to selectively prevent the use of its website
by users in any particular place. This means that even an operator who is
aware of a high number of hits from certain users may face the unpalatable
choice of risking prosecution in that place (even if the website does not
target users there) or abandoning the medium altogether.
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King
See footnote 51
The plaintiff corporation owned the internationally
famous "Blue Note" nightclub in New York City. The defendant was the owner
of a nightclub in Missouri also called "The Blue Note", which catered to
college students at the nearby university. The plaintiff sued in New York
for trademark infringement and unfair competition on the basis of the defendant's
website. It also asked the court to order the defendant to change the name
of the club and to shut down the website, which contained a calendar of upcoming
attractions, and a telephone number to call for further information. The
Missouri Blue Note website originally contained a hyperlink to the New York
"Blue Note" site, but it was removed when the plaintiff complained.
The U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the trial decision
dismissing the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction.
Under New York's long-arm statute, a court has
jurisdiction if a tort is committed in the state or damages are suffered
there. With respect to the site of the tort, the court held that all the
acts complained of (the creation of the website, the use of the Blue Note
name and the creation of the hyperlink) had taken place in Missouri at the
instigation of Missouri residents. Jurisdiction over non-resident defendants
based on the occurrence of damage in New York had to be restrictively
interpreted. In this case, the defendant could not reasonably foresee that
its acts could cause damage in New York, nor was it obtaining substantial
income from inter-state commercial activity. The mere fact that the defendant
hired nationally-known musicians to play, and that its student clientele
might be not be uniquely Missouri residents, was not enough to attract
jurisdiction.
The reasoning in the Bensusan case is appealing
because the court looks beyond the potential effect of the internet's use
to examine its actual effect on the facts of this case. Although advertising
of the Missouri club on the internet reached into other jurisdictions, on
the evidence the club was a local enterprise which did not threaten its namesake
in New York. The court did not even have to deal with the issue of due process,
since it found that it had no jurisdiction at all.
The court's rationale, however, is difficult to apply
to other facts. Since the defendant business in Bensusan had a single,
specific, geographical location, it was natural for the court to be skeptical
about the impact of "national" advertising on either the Missouri club's
revenues or those of the New York Blue Note. Many disputes involving the
internet will not involve a business with one specific location.
There were also none of the hallmarks of "interactivity"
on the website that complicated the analysis of jurisdiction in
Cybersell and Inset. The Missouri club website had no toll-free
number, tickets to shows could not be purchased on the internet, and there
was no mechanism for registration of users. If these elements had been present,
would the result have been different? None of these earmarks of "interactivity"
would have changed the reality of the Missouri club's customer base and the
lack of real competitive threat to the plaintiff's business. Using the analysis
of the courts in Inset and Cybersell, however, these elements
might have been a justification for the exercise of jurisdiction by the New
York court.
State of Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts,
Inc.
See footnote 52
This is an unusual case in that it involves a
quasi-penal proceeding against a non- resident. Whether the reasoning of
the court would apply in a private litigation is unclear, because public
policy considerations may have weighed more heavily than in a litigation
between two private parties. The case is discussed because, despite this
context, the court used traditional principles of jurisdiction applicable
to purely civil disputes.
Granite Gates Resorts was a Nevada company which
advertised Wagernet, a forthcoming on-line sports betting service on the
internet. The Wagernet website offered a toll-free number to call for further
information, and invited internet users to register to be included on a mailing
list. Subscribers were also warned that they should check local laws with
respect to restrictions on sports betting.
The Wagernet site was actually operated by a company
in Belize, and was connected by a hyperlink with a webpage which explained
the contract into which subscribers would enter. Under this contract, all
lawsuits against Wagernet would have to be taken in the courts of Belize,
but lawsuits against subscribers could be taken in the courts of their residence.
A consumer investigator for the Minnesota Attorney
General's office telephoned the toll-free number on the site, identified
himself as a Minnesota resident and asked about betting. He was told how
to bet, and that it was legal. This was incorrect, since all forms of sports
betting are illegal in Minnesota. On the basis of the website and the phone
call, the state sued Granite Gate for deceptive trade practices, false
advertising and consumer fraud.
The Minnesota Court found that it had jurisdiction
to proceed against Granite Gate, and the appeal court agreed. It based its
competence on its long-arm statute, which provided that it had jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant so long as this did not offend due process
considerations. The plaintiff hence had to show that the defendant had minimal
contacts with the forum and that jurisdiction would not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. In the court's words, the defendant
must have committed some act by which it "purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws".
To determine whether these tests were met, the Minnesota
court examined five factors:
-
the quantity of contacts: the court noted that computers located in
Minnesota were among the 500 computers that most often accessed the defendant's
website, and that the Wagernet mailing list included the name and address
of at least one Minnesota resident. Minnesota residents were also identified
as having used the toll-free number on the site.
-
the quality of contacts: in the court's view, the defendant had targeted
an American market by setting up a website in English and offering a U.S.
phone number.
-
connection between the cause of action and the contacts: the lawsuit
was based on the information available on the website, which was intended
for and received by Minnesota consumers.
-
the state's interest: the court found this to be self-evident since,
if the state had no interest, it could not uphold its consumer protection
laws.
-
convenience of the parties: according to the court, a company which
maintained the right to sue in subscribers' home states could not complain
when it was sued in those same states. In the court's words: " 'Foreign'
corporations that seek business in Minnesota and reserve the right to sue
Minnesotan customers in court here cannot claim inconvenience as an excuse
to avoid personal jurisdiction here, particularly in light of the state's
interest in regulating advertising and gambling."
This decision, like that in Bensusan, purports
to apply traditional rules of jurisdiction on internet activities. The results
are mixed. It is hard to dispute that the state's interest was engaged once
it was established that a Minnesota resident had been informed over the phone
that he could legally participate in on-line sports betting, and that at
least one Minnesota resident was on a mailing list.
The court's decision, however, was not based primarily
on these factors, but on the features of the website. Once again, it was
held that a website constitutes a deliberate "broadcast" everywhere, and
that this inherent quality, as well as a toll-free number on the site, suffices
to attract the jurisdiction of any state's court. As well, as in
Cybersell, the court grounded jurisdiction in the number of hits from
computers in the home forum, a factor beyond the control of the website operator.
The warning on the website about checking local laws with respect to on-line
betting was disregarded by the court. The inconvenience of litigating in
a distant forum was dismissed on the sole ground that the defendant had reserved
the right to sue in any subscriber's home state.
Conclusions
Legislative Jurisdiction to Regulate the
Internet
Existing authorities which have delineated federal
and provincial legislative jurisdiction with respect to telecommunications
are not necessarily conclusive authority in respect to legislative jurisdiction
to regulate the internet, which is in some respects a wholly new and unique
means of communication. We can therefore expect to see in the future important
constitutional litigation concerning legislative jurisdiction to regulate
the internet. In our opinion, on the basis of existing authority, Canadian
courts are likely to conclude that Parliament has exclusive legislative
jurisdiction over works and undertakings relating to the internet.
Recognition of exclusive federal jurisdiction over
works and undertakings forming an integral part of the internet communication
system would still allow the Provinces to enact legislation which incidentally
affects the internet. Under recent Supreme Court caselaw, this would leave
considerable room for provincial legislation affecting internet communication.
Indeed, some provincial regulatory bodies, such as the Quebec's Office de
la langue française and Commission de l'accès à
l'information
See footnote 53, have
already purported to apply certain provincial legislation to cyberspace-related
activities.
In our view, those developing policy or legislative
strategies concerning the regulation of the internet would be wise to bear
in mind the constitutional issues which underlie their initiatives in this
area.
How should forum
issues over internet disputes be resolved by Canadian
courts?
Given the difficulties already encountered by American
courts, it is appropriate to ask whether traditional forum principles may
be adapted to internet disputes, or whether special rules should be developed
for such jurisdictional conflicts.
Traditional rules have proved appropriate for some
cases such as Bensusan. Where litigation centers on a defendant's
activities in a single, specific, geographical location, the use of the internet
for advertising purposes should not defeat the usual rules relating to evidence
of damage within a forum and the defendant's intent (or lack of intent) to
target a specific market. The use of the internet in such cases is incidental,
and its unique qualities should not alter the usual jurisdictional principles.
See footnote 54
These rules may be inadequate, however, when the
impugned activity occurs primarily in cyberspace. A website posting may have
no particular effect in any particular place. The application of traditional
rules in these circumstances may result in a too broad jurisdiction, based
on the notion that a defendant should be compellable in the courts of any
jurisdiction where citizens may use the internet.
Some courts have attempted to adapt accepted
jurisdictional rules by differentiating between active and passive websites.
It seems reasonable that a website operator who has targeted a specific market
by referring to a particular forum, or by selling services on-line to customers,
should be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the forum. There are,
however, two problems with the test as so far formulated by U.S. courts.
First, the level of "interactivity" deemed sufficient
to trigger jurisdiction is minimal. Should the mere fact of including a toll-free
number on a website confer jurisdiction on the courts of every forum from
which the number may be used? Does the posting of a message in English
necessarily connote an attempt to target a North American market? Should
not a greater degree of intent to reach a specific market be required?
A second and greater problem is the willingness of
courts to equate the interactivity of a website with its use by parties in
a particular forum. This is unfair in that it may be impossible to know who
has used a website, or to control access from any given place. The importance
conferred on the number of hits from users in the forum shows a basic
misapprehension about the anonymity afforded by cyberspace. It is also a
departure from the traditional rule requiring a defendant to do something
to trigger competence of the courts within a specific jurisdiction.
In considering whether traditional rules on jurisdiction
may be used or adapted for internet disputes, it is important to remember
that the forum non conveniens test as currently applied by Canadian
courts may not always afford the same protection as the due process requirements
of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Canadian
test focuses on the relative merits of two or more forums, whereas the American
test addresses the unfairness that may result if a party is forced to defend
in a foreign jurisdiction. Canadian courts tend to engage in a balancing
exercise, while U.S. courts must consider procedural guarantees.
Given these potential difficulties, the caselaw which
will emerge from the Canadian courts on their jurisdiction over internet
disputes should be closely monitored. A failure by the courts to account
for the unique nature of the internet may inhibit the internet's commercial
use, since the application of traditional rules without modification may
lead to the assertion of jurisdiction grounded in very minimal contacts with
the forum. In determining jurisdiction, Canadian courts should more specifically,
in our view, consider the following guidelines:
Courts
should avoid a blanket rule equating the possibility (or even fact) of access
to a website from the domestic forum as sufficient grounding by itself for
jurisdiction. The posting of a website should accordingly not, by itself,
constitute "doing business" in any jurisdiction that has access to the web.
-
As a preliminary issue, courts should consider whether the use of the internet
is truly central to the dispute, or whether it is merely incidental. If it
falls in the latter category, jurisdiction should be found having regard
to traditional factors, and should not be unduly influenced by the far-reaching
effects of the internet.
-
Even where use of the internet is central to a dispute, there should be a
careful examination of other factors which would, in its absence, trigger
or militate against the jurisdiction of a particular court.
-
Canadian courts might usefully adopt the distinction by American courts of
the passive versus active website, on the basis that a high degree of
interactivity may show the defendant's willingness to avail itself of the
laws in a particular jurisdiction.
-
If this test is used, however, care must be taken to ensure that the
interactivity is significant. For example, the mere fact of posting information
in English (often considered to be the international language of business)
should not be taken to infer a desire by the defendant to target a North
American audience, still less to attorn to the jurisdicton of courts in any
particular province or state.
-
Courts must also be careful to distinguish between the defendant's acts in
cyberspace, and those of other internet users. The calculation of "hits"
from a particular jurisdiction may be a legitimate gauge of the parties'
jurisdictional expectations in some cases; where, for example, website activities
can reasonably be expected to be monitored by its operator. Courts should
recognise that such monitoring is not always feasible nor reasonable.
-
If its appears in emerging caselaw that courts may be taking jurisdiction
too readily over internet disputes, consideration may be given to incorporating
an explicit fairness requirement in the forum non conveniens test,
similar to that afforded by the 14th Amendment.
The growth of the internet raises great philosophical
and practical challenges for lawyers. The law and the skills of those who
practice it must grow with the development of cyberspace. While specific
legislation in this area may be premature, it may have to be considered in
future if traditional rules cannot be adapted to this new medium.
Addendum
[by
the Uniform Law Conference of Canada]
If traditional rules do prove inadequate, uniform
legislation could be adopted by the federal and the provincial and territorial
governments. Both Parliament and provincial legislators constitutionally
appear to have a role in regulating internet use and content. Perhaps the
Federal Court of Canada and provincial courts would both adopt uniform rules.
The Federal Court of course has jurisdiction across the country now, but
harmony with and among provincial statutes would be desirable.
The harder question is perhaps whether a rule applying
only in Canada would be helpful. Canadian rules would not prevent foreign
courts from exercising jurisdiction inappropriately over Canadian residents
and enterprises, nor would it ensure Canadians fair and reasonable recourse
against foreign internet users. Yet the Canadian market is for many purposes
the most important one for Canadian businesses and consumers. Being able
to deal within the country with confidence in the jurisdictional rules would
be help to internet trade, and people might choose to deal with identifiably
Canadian sites as a result of this confidence. It is also possible that a
well-crafted set of jurisdictional rules might inspire other countries to
follow suit. The Uniform Law Conference should try to cooperate with
international efforts to study and resolve jurisdictional issues, but if
Canadian law is needed, the limits to such lawmaking should not deter the
Conference from making the effort.
Footnote: 1
This paper is a synthesis of research and analysis by the Ogilvy Renault
Internet group, in particular by Frédéric Bachand, Christian
Beaudry, Gregory Bordan, Andrew Foti, Sally Gomery and Claudine Roy.
(c) Ogilvy Renault, 1998
Footnote: 2
See for example United States of America v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701
(1996) (although this case could be distinguished because it involved a bulletin
board service rather than a website).
Footnote: 3
Trademark and copyright infringement, tortious interference with contracts
and competition issues have so far been the most fruitful source of cases
arising from internet use. American decisions include Bensusan Restaurant
Corp. v. King, 40 U.S.P.Q. (2d) 1519 (S.D.N.Y.), conf'd by the U.S. Court
of Appeals (2d cir.) on Sept. 10, 1997; Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc.
(U.S.C.A., 9th Cir. 1997); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,
1997 WL 97097 (S.D. N.Y. 1997); Heroes Inc. v. Heroes Foundation,
958 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996); IDS Life Insurance Co. v. Sun America Inc.,
958 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Inset Systems Inc. v. Instruction
Set Inc., 937 F.Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996); Maritz Inc. v. Cybergold
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); McDonough v. Fallon McElligott
Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q. (2d) 1826 (S.D. Cal. 1996); Panavision International,
L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Playboy Enterprises
Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q. (2d) 1746 and 1846
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952
F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
Footnote: 4
Cases which have considered jurisdiction in cases of alleged slander
and defamation over the internet include California Software Inc. v.
Reliability Research Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Naxos
Resources (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. Southam Inc., 1996 WL 662451 (C.D. Cal. 1996);
It's in the Cards v. Fuschetto, 1995 Wisc. App. LEXIS 489 (C.A. Wis.
1995).
Footnote: 5
The leading case on deceptive trade practices on the internet is
Minnesota (State of) v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W. 2d 715
(Minn. C.A. 1997).
Footnote: 6
Decisions which have discussed
the proper forum for contractual disputes arising from internet use include
Beverage Management Solutions Inc. v. Yankee Spirits Inc., 460 SE
2d 564 (GA C.A 1995); Cody v. Ward, 954 F.Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1997);
Compuserve Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F. 3d 1257 (6th Cir.
1996); Digital Equipment Corp. v. Altavista Technology Inc., 960 F.
Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997); Edias Software International v. Basis International
Ltd., 947 F.Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996); Hall v. LaRonde, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 399(Ca. C.A., 1997); Pres-Kap Inc. v. System One Direct Access
Inc., 636 So 2d 1351 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1994); Resuscitation Technologies
Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp., 1997 WL 148567 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
Footnote: 7
This may become particularly problematic in the context of internet dispute,
but the broad topic of choice of law goes beyond the scope of this paper.
There are certain well- recognized situations where substantive foreign law
will be held to apply: for example, where the parties have included a choice
of law provision in a contract; where under the forum's own laws, status
is determined under the laws of the place of birth or marriage; in tort,
where lex loci delicti applies; and in the enforcement of foreign
judgments (assuming that the application of foreign law does not offend public
order).
Footnote: 8
See discussion of Inset Systems Inc. v. Instruction Set Inc.,
937 F. Supp. 961 (D. Conn. 1996), infra.
Footnote: 9
Admittedly it is less probable that courts will be too reticent to take
competence over disputes simply because they involve the use of the internet.
As a judge of the Federal Court recently remarked in allowing an injunction
against a website operator apparently in violation of trademark: "It may
perhaps be said that the case before me is already one in which, notwithstanding
the peregrinations of the Internet in terms of seamless borders and its obtrusive
presence across whole continents, the basic principles of property ownership
require continuing protection." See Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v.
Canadian Business Online Inc., [1997] F.C.J. No. 1387 (unreported decision
of Joyal J. on September 17, 1997, court file no. T-1340-97).
Footnote: 10
Courts in other jurisdictions in Europe and elsewhere have also dealt
with courts' jurisdiction over internet disputes, but due to space considerations
this caselaw will not be discussed.
Footnote: 11
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 000 U.S. 96-511 (1997),
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/hmtl/96-511.ZS.html .
Footnote: 12
See, generally, P. HOGG, Constitutional Law of Canada, (Carswell,
Toronto, 1992), at pp. 565 et seq..
Footnote: 13
Westcoast Energy Inc. v. Canada (National Energy Board), S.C.C.,
n
°25259, March 18,
1998, at p. 30.
Footnote: 14
Id., at p. 30.
Footnote: 15
E.g. Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television
Commission, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 (television); Toronto v. Bell Telephone
Co., [1905] A.C. 52, Alberta Government Telephones v. Canadian
Radio-Television Commission, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 225 and
Téléphone Guévremont Inc. v. Québec (Régie
des télécommunications), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 878 (telephone).
Footnote: 16
Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communications in Canada, [1932]
A.C. 304 (P.C.); Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian
Radio-Television Commission, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141, at p. 161.
Footnote: 17
See, for example, D. MULAN and R. BEAMAN, "The Constitutional Implications
of the Regulation of Telecommunications", (1973) 4 Queens L.J. 67,
at p. 71. The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded likewise in Re C.F.R.B.
and Attorney-General for Canada, [1973] 3 O.R. 819, at p. 823.
Footnote: 18
R.A. BRAITT, "The Constitutional Jurisdiction to Regulate the Provision
of Telephone Services in Canada", (1981) 13 Ott. L.R. 53, at pp. 79
et seq.
Footnote: 19
For an informative survey of the case law, see P. HOGG, Constitutional
Law of Canada (Carswell, Toronto, 1992), at pp. 565 et seq.
Footnote: 20
Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la
sécurité du travail), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749, at p. 762.
Footnote: 21
Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television
Commission, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141, at p. 162.
Footnote: 22
In Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927, the Supreme Court found that a statute regulating advertising addressed
to minors, including adverstising broadcast on television, was intra
vires Quebec's National Assembly because the provincial statute specifically
targeted advertisers, not broadcasters. See also Attorney General of Quebec
v. Kellogg's Co. of Canada, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 211 and Air Canada v.
Ontario (Liquor Control Board), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 581, at p. 609.
Footnote: 23
For example, art. 3134 of the Civil Code of Quebec states that:
"In the absence of any special provision, the Quebec authorities have
jurisdiction when the defendant is
domiciled in Quebec." In Ontario, the assumption of jurisdiction over defendants
residing within the province is implicit in rule 17 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, which establishes the circumstances in which a defendant not
in Ontario may be served with an originating process without leave of the
court. In personam jurisdiction is preserved in secart. 3(d) of the
Uniform Law Conference of Canada'sLCC's draft Uniform Court Jurisdiction
and Proceedings Transfer Act (hereinafter the "Draft Uniform Jurisdiction
Act") which states that "A court has territorial competence in a proceeding
that is brought against a person only if . that person is ordinarily resident
in" the enacting province's territory "at the time of the commencement of
the proceeding". The Uniform Act is at
http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/ulc/acts/ejurisd.htm .
Footnote: 24
This principle was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Morguard
Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye , [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 and upheld
subsequently in Hunt v. T & N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289. In the
latter decision, the Supreme Court of Canada wrote that the "real and substantial
connection" test is grounded in constitutional values. See also J.-G. Castel,
Canadian Conflict of Laws 4th ed. (Butterworths, Toronto,
1997) at pp. 52 et seq.
Footnote: 25
Art. 3148, al. 2 C.C.Q. and secart. 10(h) of the Draft Uniform
Jurisdiction Act. Rule 17.02(p) of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure
simply provides that extraterritorial service may be effected without leave
on any person "carrying on business in Ontario".
Footnote: 26
Art. 3148, al. 3 C.C.Q., rule 17.02(g) of the Ontario Rules
of Civil Procedure and secart. 10(g) of the Draft Uniform Jurisdiction
Act.
Footnote: 27
Art. 3148, al. 3 C.C.Q. and rule 17.02(h) of the Ontario Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Footnote: 28
Art. 3148, al. 3 C.C.Q. and secart. 10(e) of the Draft Uniform
Jurisdiction Act. Rule 17.02(f)(iv) of the Ontario Rules of Civil
Procedure similarly provides that an out-of- Province defendant may be
served without leave in an action arising from a "breach of contract . committed
in Ontario", which presumably implies that contractual obligations were to
be performed there.
Footnote: 29
Art. 3148, al. 4 C.C.Q.; rule 17.02(f)(iii) of the Ontario Rules
of Civil Procedure; and secart. 3(c) of the Draft Uniform Jurisdiction
Act.
Footnote: 30
Rule 17.02(f)(ii) of the Ontario Rules and secart. 10(e)(ii) of
the Draft Uniform Jurisdiction Act. This is not a ground for competence
explicitly recognized in the Quebec Civil Code, although a choice
of law provision mandating the application of Quebec law
would certainly be relevant to the issue of jurisdiction.
Footnote: 31
Arts. 3141 et seq. C.C.Q.; Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. 3
(2d supp.), ss. 3-7; rule 17.02(j), (k) and (l) of the Ontario Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rules governing competence over family law matters are
not included in the Draft Uniform Jurisdiction Act.
Footnote: 32
Arts. 3152 and 3154 C.C.Q.; rules 17.02(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e)
of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure and sarts. 10 (a), (b), (c)
or (d) of the Draft Uniform Jurisdiction Act.
Footnote: 33
Art. 3136 C.C.Q. (which actually refers to "sufficient connection")
and secart. 3(e) of the Draft Uniform Jurisdiction Act. Common law provinces
such as Ontario generally provide that where a plaintiff asserts a "real
and substantial connection" not explicitly provided for in the rules, leave
of the court must be obtained before the non-resident defendant may be served;
see rule 17.03(1) of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure.
Footnote: 34
Hunt v. T & N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289and Tolofsen v. Jensen,
[1994] S.C.R. 1022.
Footnote: 35
For a more complete discussion of the rules governing forum in the U.S. and
their impact on dispute related to the internet, see Barry Sookman, "Personal
Jurisdiction and the Internet: If you put material in Cyberspace, Where can
you be sued?", a paper presented at the Computer and Cyberspace Law Convention
at the University of Dayton School of Law in July 1997.
Footnote: 36
Helicopteros Nationales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408; Data
Disc Inc. v. Systems Technology Associations Inc., 557 F. 2d 1280
(9th Cir. 1977).
Footnote: 37
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310.
Footnote: 38
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286.
Footnote: 39
This test is used by both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals. For an example of how it has been applied in a
lawsuit involving internet issues, see CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson,
supra at note 6.
Footnote: 40
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462; CompuServe Inc. v.
Patterson, supra at note 6; California Software Inc. v. Reliability
Research, Inc, supra at note 4.
Footnote: 41
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, ibid.; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, supra at note 38.
Footnote: 42
Rule 17.06(2) of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure says that a court may
stay a proceedings or set aside service of a non-resident defendant if it
is satisfied that Ontario is not "a convenient forum" for the hearing of
the proceeding. SecArt. 14 of the Draft Uniform Jurisdiction Act says that
a case may be transferred to the court of another jurisdiction if the receiving
court has subject matter competence in the proceedings and it is a "more
appropriate forum"
Footnote: 43
Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897.
Footnote: 44
For good examples of the application of such principles, see Frymer v.
Brettschneider (1994), 28 C.P.C. (3d) 84 (Ont. C.A.) and MacDonald
v. Lasnier (1994), 21 O.R. (3d) 177 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
Footnote: 45
In Dennis v. Salvation Army Grace General Hospital (1997), 14 C.P.C.
(4th) 207 (N.S.C.A.), a medical malpractice suit, the defendant
physicians and hospital moved to stay the proceedings in Nova Scotia on the
grounds that all of the alleged tortious conduct had taken place in Newfoundland,
all of the defendants resided in Newfoundland, and all of the hospital and
medical records relating to the alleged malpractice were also there. These
factors seemed to argue strongly for a transfer of the case to the courts
of Newfoundland. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal nevertheless reversed the
motions court judgment allowing the stay, on the basis that the plaintiffs
would face great financial and psychological hardship in returning to
Newfoundland for discoveries and the trial, and that damages had occurred
in both Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, where the plaintiffs had moved shortly
after the alleged malpractice took place. See in the same vein Oakley
v. Barry (N.S.C.A. no. 137568, judgment rendered March 27, 1998) and
Dunlop v. Connecticut College (1996), 50 C.P.C. (3d) 109 (Ont. Gen.
Div.).
Footnote: 46
Frymer v. Brettschneider and MacDonald v. Lasnier, supra
at note 32.
Footnote: 47
A very recent decision by the Ontario Court (General Division) touched on
the issue peripherally. In Kitakufe v. Oloya, [1998] O.J. No. 2537
(unreported decision of Himel J. dated June 18, 1998 in Court file no.
97-CV-133151), an Ontario resident sued for damages arising from statements
about him in a Ugandan newspaper, extracts of which were reproduced on the
internet. The defendant brought a forum non conveniens motion to stay
the suit in Ontario, alleging that Uganda was the more convenient forum.
Madamr . Justice Himel dismissed the motion. ShHe did not discuss the effect
of the internet posting on the jurisdictional issue, but did state that the
plaintiff's alleged damages would have been suffered in Ontario. Beyond this,
the Court's analysis is made on the basis of traditional forum non
conveniens factors, such as the residence of the defendant, the location
of expert witnesses, and potential hardship and expense associated with being
forced to sue in Uganda.
Footnote: 48
Remarkably, the decision of the U.S. District Court in California in
California Software Inc. v. Reliability Research Inc. dates from 1986,
almost 10 years before any other reported case. It is no coincidence that
this case involved parties involved in computer software programming and
distribution. See supra at note 4.
Footnote: 49
Supra at note 3.
Footnote: 50
Supra at note 3.
Footnote: 51
Supra at note 3.
Footnote: 52
Supra at note 5.
Footnote: 53
See the Office de la langue française's brochure entitled "Information
Technologies in French. It's Your Right . It's Your Duty"; see the Commission
de l'accès à l'information's website at
www.cai.gouv.qc.ca/auto.html
("L'accès à l'information
et la confidentialité des renseignements personnels sur l'autoroute
de l'information").
Footnote: 54
In a similar vein see Naxos Resources (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. Southam Inc.,
1996 W.L. 662451 (C.D.Calif. 1996).
July 1998
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